It must be admitted that, even 40-odd years since its birth, the old battle cry of "The personal is political," remains a succinct analysis of the relationship between the subject and the state, as a quick glance at our politics aptly demonstrates. Deciding where and when the government should intervene in such issues as pregnancy, sex, and marriage remain subjects, if not of enlightened discourse, at least of 30 second campaign ads.
Even beyond the sphere of these intimate issues, the role of the state is on lips of everyone this election year, from the pundits at Fox to the pundits at MSNBC. Indeed, it almost seems impossible not to have an opinion on how Washington should act with regards to the economy, military action, policing of the border, et cetera, et cetera. Going back in time, America's founding documents are dedicated to laying out (in principle, if not always in practice) clear areas of action and restriction of governmental power.
 |
| Now in handy cartoon form! |
You would be justified, dear reader, in wondering what these musings have to do with the Alcibiades. When we left our heroes at the close of the last post, Socrates was in the midst of seducing Alcibiades, promising that it was only through Socrates' wisdom (and love) that Alcibiades could realize his political hopes. But the issues that we debate today in our own soundbite-y way are direct descendants of those that are discussed in the portion of the dialogue that is the topic of this post, namely the proper role and function of the state, as well as the role of the citizen, insofar as he is a political participant, in ensuring that this function is carried out.
Having gotten Alcibiades consent to proceed in the discussion not through speeches but through question-and-answer, Socrates poses a seemingly simple question to his would-be lover: Given that you are soon to speak before the Assembly, what is the subject that you are going to advise the Athenians about (106c)? For Alcibiades, the answer is patently simple: He will speak to the Athenians "about something that I know better than they do" (106d).
Such an answer, however obvious it might be to Alcibiades, is hardly persuasive for Socrates. To begin his critique of it, Socrates offers the premise that if Alcibiades or anyone else has knowledge of a subject, he has either been taught that knowledge by a teacher or discovered it through his own effort (106d). Socrates, seemingly putting aside for the moment the question of what Alcibiades has taught himself, lays out what, in the course of his stalking, he has seen Alcibiades learn. Alcibiades, as it happens, has received an education fitting his station as a good aristocrat of Athens, learning to read and to write, how to wrestle, and how to play the lyre. Of course, as Socrates is quick to point out, it is very rare for the Assembly to have intense debates either on the regulation wrestling or on the correct method of playing the lyre.
Indeed, Socrates continues, Alcibiades is ignorant of issues of actual municipal import, such as shipbuilding or structural engineering or prophecy. Even further, the good looks, ancient bloodline, immense wealth and the other qualities that we saw in the first section are the source of Alcibiades' immense pride offer no aid when it comes to this issue. Knowledge is only true criterion for superiority, for "[w]hether he's short or tall, or beautiful or ugly, or even noble or of low birth," someone trained as a diviner or a doctor or a builder would do better than he in advising the city (107c).
Indeed, Socrates continues, Alcibiades is ignorant of issues of actual municipal import, such as shipbuilding or structural engineering or prophecy. Even further, the good looks, ancient bloodline, immense wealth and the other qualities that we saw in the first section are the source of Alcibiades' immense pride offer no aid when it comes to this issue. Knowledge is only true criterion for superiority, for "[w]hether he's short or tall, or beautiful or ugly, or even noble or of low birth," someone trained as a diviner or a doctor or a builder would do better than he in advising the city (107c).
 |
| Quite a climb, but I imagine the views are worth it |
If none of the above are topics on which Alcibiades can advise the city of Athens, on what subject would he be a useful expert in the Assembly? Alcibiades now provides a second answer, that he will speak before the Assembly as an expert on the city's "own affairs," which he later clarifies as "war...or peace, or some other affair of the city" (107c). While Alcibiades' answer is still very broad, Socrates hones in on war-making as the cornerstone of the city's affairs, getting Alcibiades to agree that he will speak about against whom, where, and for how long Athens should wage war (107d).
The question remains, however, if he is to advise the city on war, in what way does Alcibiades know how to carry out this task better than other Athenians? To address this topic, we must consider the perennial Platonic topic of techne or craft. While this word is deserves several books' worth of blog posts, one can express it simply and not to unjustly as the idea that anyone who truly knows a craft knows not just the mechanical components of his art but also how to use these effects to produce a desired end. In one of the example that Socrates uses for instance, a true craftsmen of lyre playing will know not just what note is made when plucking a string, but also how and when to use his playing techniques to produce the better musical outcome (108a).
Similarly, Socrates argues, there must be some sort of techne that once known would dictate how and why a city wages war. Alcibiades proves unable to name this knowledge when asked, so Socrates prompts him by pointing out that each time Athens has gone to war, it has been to correct an injustice it believes it has suffered. This leads Socrates to claim that it is knowing the nature of justice that would make Alcibiades a true expert on war and peace (109c). Continuing the mocking attitude noted above, Socrates asks for Alcibiades' teachers in such matters, which of course Alcibiades is unable to name (109e)1.
Similarly, Socrates argues, there must be some sort of techne that once known would dictate how and why a city wages war. Alcibiades proves unable to name this knowledge when asked, so Socrates prompts him by pointing out that each time Athens has gone to war, it has been to correct an injustice it believes it has suffered. This leads Socrates to claim that it is knowing the nature of justice that would make Alcibiades a true expert on war and peace (109c). Continuing the mocking attitude noted above, Socrates asks for Alcibiades' teachers in such matters, which of course Alcibiades is unable to name (109e)1.
 |
| The Fall of Troy - Vae Victis |
By the end of this section, then, we seem to be on a course to temper Alcibiades' overweening ambition. He has been shown that all of his advantages do not even make him more fit than the lowliest tradesman to advise the Assembly, at least when it comes to that tradesman's area of expertise. Further, Alcibiades has been compelled to admit that he has never had a teacher of justice, which perhaps provides room for Socrates to assume this role.
Nonetheless, I think there is a hint of foreboding in this scene that contrasts with the uplifting discourse Socrates has laid out. We already know, as Plato's readers would have, that the future career of Alcibiades was anything but dedicated to justice or the good management of Athen's affairs or to any cause at all save personal advantage. Indeed, Plato seems to hint at these future events in some of Alcibiades' comments in his dialogue. While agreeing with Socrates that justice is the guiding principle of Athenian politics, Alcibiades' response could also be seen as equivocating on whether this more appearance than reality. For instance, while Alcibiades agrees at 109c that no man would admit to advocating war against a just state that had done Athens no wrong, his answer does not preclude presenting the actions of a just city in an unjust light to win over the Athenian populace. In light of Alcibiades' advocacy for attacking Syracuse, one can see the disastrous endpoint of this line of thought.
Even more telling, I think, is a small exchange that happens near the beginning of this portion of the dialogue. Socrates, having just laid out his suspicions about the limitless nature of Alcibiades' ambition, asks to continue the conversation on the assumption that his description of Alcibiades' desire is correct. Alcibiades' response is not to admit the truth or falsity of Socrates' surmise, but rather "So be it, if you want, so I can know what you're going to say" (106c). With such an answer, Alcibiades avoids having to face the truth about himself and his desires, and instead treats the whole affair as a hypothetical. Alcibiades, it would seem, is mistaking the peripheral benefits of Socrates' wisdom (the aid to his political career) as the central aim of the philosopher's task, instead of the search for knowledge.
At the close of the last post on the Alcibiades, I put forward as a guiding theme for this work an inquiry into the nature Socrates' attraction for Alcibiades. After this section, I think the importance of this question is undiminished. Alcibiades will happily listen to Socrates discourse. Indeed, compared to other people Socrates meets in the dialogue, he is perhaps one of the most attentive and engaged listeners. Yet if Alcibiades cannot examine himself in the say critical way as, for instance, he saw the faults of his other lovers, Socrates' love may merely training Alcibiades to be a better tyrant over Athens.
 |
| It didn't really end well (spoilers) |
↩
1 In this context it is interesting to turn Book II of the Republic, where Plato also discuss the relationship between warfare, cities, and justice. Here, once a desire for luxury has forced the city to claim land from others in warfare to support itself, it is necessary to introduce a class of guardians who will engage in warfare on the city's behalf. It is the education of the guardians through the strict inculcation of morals and sense of justice that provide much of the content of the work.
No comments:
Post a Comment