When I was just beginning my education, my fellows and I were subjected to an exercise in intellectual betterment referred to as the Socratic Method. What this consisted in, as near as I can tell, was the idea that if all the pupils in a classroom put their desks in a circle instead of rows, the feast of reason and communion of souls would spontaneously commence and all would be lifted to a higher plane of mind and beauty. Such, I regret to report, did not turn out to be the case. This anecdote, however, does serve a useful purpose insofar as it brings to mind a major subject of the Alcibiades that we have so far left unaddressed, namely what is the nature of the method Socrates is using in the dialogue.
To be sure, this topic has come up in earlier parts of the dialogue. In the last post, for instance, we saw that Socrates continued talking with Alcibiades only after they agreed to discourse in a question and answer format, rather than by means of long, flowery speeches that would be considered the model of civilized discourse in the period. In the section now under consideration, however, the issue of Socrates' method and its goal comes to the fore and with it, I think, insight into the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades.
Such matters might not be immediately evident from the conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades, which continues the discussion on justice from the prior part of the dialogue. Having shown that Alcibiades was never taught justice by a teacher, the pair now examine the possibility that Alcibiades knows what is just through his own discovery. If that were the case, Socrates argues, there must have been some point in Alcibiades' life where a) he was ignorant of the true nature of justice and b) he was aware of this ignorance so that he would know to undertake the investigation (110a). Socrates' stalking has revealed, however, that even as a young boy losing at dice, Alcibiades "didn't act like one who was at a loss about what's just and what's unjust, but with a big, bold voice (he'd) say that whatever boy it happened to be was a wretch and unjust and was acting unjustly" (110b).
If Alcibiades from the early part of his childhood assumed that he knew what justice was, then he would never, according to the argument, have bothered to investigate what he thought he already knew, and thus he must actually still be ignorant of the nature of the just. At this point, Alcibiades has an alternative to offer: Although he cannot name an individual who had taught him justice, could he not have learned about justice from the community as a whole? While Socrates dismiss the possibility, Alcibiades compares this type of instruction to the way that he was taught to speak Greek: "I couldn't tell you who my teacher was, but I give credit to those very people who you said were not serious teachers" (110e).
Socrates, however, asserts that being taught to speak and being taught justice are not comparable undertakings. If people are experts in the same subject, he argues, and thus have the right knowledge of it to teach it, they will be in agreement in matters pertaining to that subject. In the cases in language this means everyone agrees that the word "stick" refers to a stick and "stone" to a stone (111c). Contrarily the nature of justice is a subject where there is clearly a great deal of disagreement among people and cities. If the masses disagree as to what justice is, then this is a sign that, taken as a whole, the populace does not have expertise in justice and thus cannot teach it to Alcibiades.
If Alcibiades from the early part of his childhood assumed that he knew what justice was, then he would never, according to the argument, have bothered to investigate what he thought he already knew, and thus he must actually still be ignorant of the nature of the just. At this point, Alcibiades has an alternative to offer: Although he cannot name an individual who had taught him justice, could he not have learned about justice from the community as a whole? While Socrates dismiss the possibility, Alcibiades compares this type of instruction to the way that he was taught to speak Greek: "I couldn't tell you who my teacher was, but I give credit to those very people who you said were not serious teachers" (110e).
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| List of cities paying tribute to Athens |
Socrates, however, asserts that being taught to speak and being taught justice are not comparable undertakings. If people are experts in the same subject, he argues, and thus have the right knowledge of it to teach it, they will be in agreement in matters pertaining to that subject. In the cases in language this means everyone agrees that the word "stick" refers to a stick and "stone" to a stone (111c). Contrarily the nature of justice is a subject where there is clearly a great deal of disagreement among people and cities. If the masses disagree as to what justice is, then this is a sign that, taken as a whole, the populace does not have expertise in justice and thus cannot teach it to Alcibiades.
While these conclusions are presented as merely the endpoints of logical argument, they are actually attacking the core values of Athens. Given the considerable Athenian pride in her (limited) democratic institutions, Socrates' conclusion that the citizenry as a whole has no understanding of justice is politically imprudent, to put it mildly. Indeed, some of Socrates' words are downright insulting, as when he says that hoi polloi could not even teach "good and bad moves in checkers" (110e). In this way, Socrates continues to work his seduction, denigrating the very people that Alcibiades was so keen to impress at the beginning of the dialogue with his Assembly speeches.
Speaking of Socrates' love, we are now better able to see the source of his desire. In these passages, Plato depicts a side of Alcibiades' character and intelligence that it is plausible Socrates would find attractive. Previously, Alcibiades had demonstrated both a tyrannical inclinations and a passivity in conversation, content to simply follow Socrates' lead. While the former remains an issue, what we see now is Alcibiades emerging as a true, if junior, partner, in the discussion. For instance, at 109e Alcibiades does not just answer Socrates but asks questions of his own to move the conversation in a new direction, investigating whether he could have discovered justice by his own efforts. And as we have seen, Alcibiades even formulates a new idea, that of the masses as teacher of justice, even if in the end it is disproven by Socrates.
To conclude, I would like to turn to the issue that began this post, the nature of Socrates dialectical method. Towards the end of this section of the dialogue, when asked directly whether, given the foregoing arguments, it's clear that he doesn't know what justice is, Alcibiades says, "From what you are saying, it is not likely" (112d). This continues the pattern of Alcibiades avoiding directly committing himself to a position, an attribute that we had noted before. Yet this time, Socrates does not allow Alcibiades to be so evasive. Pointing out that all this time they have proceeded through question and answer, Socrates proves to Alcibiades that in such a form of conversation, it is the answerer who is speaking and making assertions, as he is the one who is providing conclusions to the questioner's inquiries (113a). Since Alcibiades had been answering Socrates questions, he stands accused from his own mouth of not understanding what justice is: "[Y]ou probably haven't heard these things from me, nor am I the one speaking, but it's you who are speaking, and you blame me in vain" (113c).
Of course, one could protest that just because Socrates has phrased all his statements in the form of a question, this hardly means that he is not guiding the conversation. After all, Socrates is not asking questions in service of a disinterested investigation, but to steer Alcibiades into certain conclusions about his values and desires. Further, despite the usual caricatures of philosophers as ultra-rational, Socrates is not above playing on the emotions to get his way. When demonstrating how people and cities disagree about justice, for instance, Socrates brings up Alcibiades' dead father, who died in battle with another polis, Socrates argues, to assert an Athenian version of justice (112c). This point may be extraneous to the logic of the argument, but it gives Socrates an emotional lever to move Alcibiades to see that men and states disagree about the nature of justice and the consequences of this disagreement.
One cannot deny that these objections have some merit. Regardless, I do feel Socrates is honest about the importance of acting as a questioner rather than a speechmaker. At the very least, Alcibiades is being forced to uncover both his ambitions, as we saw in the first post, and his ignorance of justice. In a speech, even if Alcibiades heard these claims, it would be extremely easy for him to either have mental reservations or simply ignore them. Even if it is sometimes grudging, getting Alcibiades to acknowledge these thing is an important achievement. The next test for Socrates will be to clinch his initial premise, that it is only through his help that Alcibiades will achieve his desire.
Speaking of Socrates' love, we are now better able to see the source of his desire. In these passages, Plato depicts a side of Alcibiades' character and intelligence that it is plausible Socrates would find attractive. Previously, Alcibiades had demonstrated both a tyrannical inclinations and a passivity in conversation, content to simply follow Socrates' lead. While the former remains an issue, what we see now is Alcibiades emerging as a true, if junior, partner, in the discussion. For instance, at 109e Alcibiades does not just answer Socrates but asks questions of his own to move the conversation in a new direction, investigating whether he could have discovered justice by his own efforts. And as we have seen, Alcibiades even formulates a new idea, that of the masses as teacher of justice, even if in the end it is disproven by Socrates.
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| I realized that I haven't had any pictures of Plato on this blog. So here you go. |
To conclude, I would like to turn to the issue that began this post, the nature of Socrates dialectical method. Towards the end of this section of the dialogue, when asked directly whether, given the foregoing arguments, it's clear that he doesn't know what justice is, Alcibiades says, "From what you are saying, it is not likely" (112d). This continues the pattern of Alcibiades avoiding directly committing himself to a position, an attribute that we had noted before. Yet this time, Socrates does not allow Alcibiades to be so evasive. Pointing out that all this time they have proceeded through question and answer, Socrates proves to Alcibiades that in such a form of conversation, it is the answerer who is speaking and making assertions, as he is the one who is providing conclusions to the questioner's inquiries (113a). Since Alcibiades had been answering Socrates questions, he stands accused from his own mouth of not understanding what justice is: "[Y]ou probably haven't heard these things from me, nor am I the one speaking, but it's you who are speaking, and you blame me in vain" (113c).
Of course, one could protest that just because Socrates has phrased all his statements in the form of a question, this hardly means that he is not guiding the conversation. After all, Socrates is not asking questions in service of a disinterested investigation, but to steer Alcibiades into certain conclusions about his values and desires. Further, despite the usual caricatures of philosophers as ultra-rational, Socrates is not above playing on the emotions to get his way. When demonstrating how people and cities disagree about justice, for instance, Socrates brings up Alcibiades' dead father, who died in battle with another polis, Socrates argues, to assert an Athenian version of justice (112c). This point may be extraneous to the logic of the argument, but it gives Socrates an emotional lever to move Alcibiades to see that men and states disagree about the nature of justice and the consequences of this disagreement.
One cannot deny that these objections have some merit. Regardless, I do feel Socrates is honest about the importance of acting as a questioner rather than a speechmaker. At the very least, Alcibiades is being forced to uncover both his ambitions, as we saw in the first post, and his ignorance of justice. In a speech, even if Alcibiades heard these claims, it would be extremely easy for him to either have mental reservations or simply ignore them. Even if it is sometimes grudging, getting Alcibiades to acknowledge these thing is an important achievement. The next test for Socrates will be to clinch his initial premise, that it is only through his help that Alcibiades will achieve his desire.
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